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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11
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IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20020590-CA

EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
driving under the influence of alcohol with two prior DUI convictions, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2000). This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea where the court strictly complied with rule 11 and the prosecutor fulfilled his plea
agreement to make a favorable sentencing recommendation?
Standard of Review. "The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for findings
of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 14,26 P.3d
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203. "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,433 (Utah 1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(4)
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
* * *

(4)( A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantialriskof conviction;
• * *

Utah Code Ann, S 41-6-44(2)(a) & (€)(*) (SUPP. 2000)
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater,
or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that renders the
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
* * *

(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree
felony.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol with two prior
DUI convictions, driving on a suspended license, and driving without registration. R. 1-2.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol
with two prior DUI convictions and the remaining two charges were dismissed. R. 33-41. In
accordance with the plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended that defendant serve only
90 days in jail with credit for time served. See R. 107:8-9. The trial court, however,
followed the recommendation in the presentence investigation report and sentenced
defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years. R. 41; R. 107: 10.
Following his sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 44-45.
After new counsel was appointed, defendant filed an amended motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. R. 53, 56-69. The court denied defendant's motion. R. 98. Defendant immediately
filed a motion to reconsider, alleging for the first time that the prosecutor had not complied
with the terms of the plea bargain . R. 83-95. The trial court again denied the motion.
R. 100-02. Defendant timely appealed. R. 103.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

On August 25,2000, defendant and a friend purchased a case of beer at a Blanding
gas station. R. 106: 4, 8. Some two-and-a-half hours later, defendant returned to the store
with his friend. R. 106: 8. As he drove into the gas station, defendant overshot his approach
to the gas pump, driving straight for the pole holding up the canopy. R. 106:4. He slammed
3

on the brakes short of the pole, backed up and again braked abruptly, and finally pulled up to
the gas pump. R. 106: 4, 13. Defendant almost fell over backwards when he exited the
driver's seat. R. 106: 5, 13-14. As he filled the truck with gas, defendant had to steady
himself to remain upright. R. 106: 6.
Meanwhile, defendant's friend entered the store and appeared to be "doing quite
well." R. 106: 8. However, when he tried to purchase more alcohol, the store manager
refused based on his observations of defendant at the gas pump. See R. 106:8. After filling
the truck, defendant staggered into the store. See R. 106:5-6. His eyes were glazed over, his
speech was 'Very slurred," and a "strong" odor of alcohol emanatedfromhis person. R. 106:
6, 18.1 After observing defendant's inability to adequately maintain his balance and his
glazed-over eyes, the manager concluded that defendant had in fact "had too much to drink"
and that he was "obviously way past anything reasonable." R. 106: 5, 8,14. At that point,
the manager telephoned police. R. 106: 9-10.
Once in the store, defendant began arguing with hisfriendover how much each should
pay for the gas. R. 106: 5. Over the next several minutes, the argument escalated and
defendant threatened to kill his friend. R. 106:14. Because officers had still not responded,
the manager placed a second call to police. R. 106:9-10. Police arrived a few minutes later.
R. 106:10. On observing defendant, San Juan County Sheriff Mike Lacey also concluded

1

The store manager testified that he could not smell things very well and thus could
not smell any odor of alcohol coming from defendant. R. 106: 7. However, Sheriff Mike
Lacy testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol from defendant's person. R. 106: 18.
4

that defendant was "very intoxicated." R. 106: 17. SheriffLacey observed that defendant
had difficulty exiting another officer's vehicle and that he was very unsteady on his feet,
nearly falling down a couple of times. R. 106: 17-18. Defendant was very boisterous, still
complaining about his friend and declaring that he was going to kill him. R. 106:18. Sheriff
Lacey also noticed that defendant's speech was very slurred and that a strong odor of alcohol
emanated from his person. R. 106: 17-18. After arriving at the police station, defendant
refused to submit to a breathalyzer. R. 106:19,22. Defendant had been convicted of driving
under the influence twice before. R. 106: 24.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 11 Compliance. The trial court strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The plea affidavit of defendant, which incorporated the Information,
adequately explained the nature and elements of the offense to which defendant pled guilty.
The affidavit also set forth an adequate factual basis for the plea. That factual basis was
augmented by the transcript of the preliminary hearing where the same judge who took the
plea resided.
Plea Agreement. In accordance with the plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended
that defendant serve 90 days in the county jail, to be served concurrently with a sentence
defendant was presently serving. Defendant received the benefit of the bargain and thus was
not entitled to the withdrawal of his plea. The prosecutor's subsequent recommendation to
the Board of Pardons, which was not contemplated under the agreement, did not constitute a
breach of the agreement. If appropriate, the court may remand the case with instructions that
5

the prosecutor file an amended report with the Board explaining more fully the plea
agreement.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea
for two reasons* First, he contends that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it did not establish that defendant understood the
nature and elements of the offense and that there was a factual basis for the plea. Aplt. Brf.
at 10-17. Second, defendant contends that the prosecutor did not fulfill his obligation under
the plea agreement. Aplt Brf. at 17-24. Both grounds lack merit
A.

THE TRIAL, COURT STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that before accepting a guilty
plea, the trial court must make a number offindingsrelating to a defendant's rights and the
consequences of pleading guilty. Trial courts must strictly comply with rule 11, '"personally
establishing] that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and
establishing] on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional
rights.'" State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11,22 P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d
993, 995 (Utah 1993)).
The trial court's rule 11 findings "may be based on questioning of the defendant on
the record or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has established
6

that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the sworn
statement." Utah R. Crim. P. (e)(8). Rule 11 findings may also be based on other record
factors, including "the contents of other documents such as the information, presentence
reports, exhibits, etc., similarly incorporated into the record, and so on." State v. Maguire,
830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991); accord Visser, 2000 UT 88, at f 12. "[Sjtrict compliance
can [thus] be accomplished by multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is
omitted and so long as the record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled." Maguire,
830 P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1991).
Defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2000). R. 33-34; R. 108:7. Section
41-6-44 provides:
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater;
or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that renders the
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
* * *

(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree
felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) & (6)(a) (Supp. 2000). To satisfy rule 11 requirements,
defendant submitted a sworn statement setting forth his rights and acknowledging that he
understood he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty. See R. 33-40 (Addendum A).
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Before accepting defendant's guilty plea, the court established that defendant had read,
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. See R. 108: 6-7. After doing
so, the court fulfilled the requirements of rule 11,findingthat "defendant [was] aware of his
legal and constitutional rights [under rule 11] and that he [ ] knowingly and voluntarily
waived those rights." R. 108: 7. The trial court then "orderfed] that the plea be entered."
R. 108: 7.
1. Defendant Understood the Nature and Elements of Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol.
Defendant argues that the plea affidavit inaccurately identified the nature and elements
of the crime to which he pled guilty. Aplt Brf. at 10-17. At issue, therefore, is the rule 11
requirement that the court find that:
the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements
Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(e)(4XA). Defendant claims that the affidavit only referenced the legal
limit alternative of the DUI statute. Aplt Brf. at 15. He reasons that because he refused to
submit to a chemical test, he could not be convicted of driving with a breath alcohol
concentration (BAC) of .08 or greater, but only of driving while illegally impaired. Aplt.
Brf. at 16. He thus argues that the record "did not adequately establish that [he] understood
the elements of the offense that the government would have to show." Aplt. Brf. at 16-17.
Defendant's claim is rebutted by the record.
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On page 2 of the sworn statement, defendant acknowledged his understanding of the
nature and elements of the offense as follows:
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have
read it, or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of
crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest)
are:
Actual physical control of a vehicle
w/ BAC of. 08 or greater w/ 2 or
more prior DUVs w/i 6 years
R. 34 (emphasized lines hand-written). Defendant focuses only on the hand-written portion
of the statement, ignoring the initial paragraph which incorporates the Information. In that
paragraph, defendant acknowledges that he "received a copy of the (Amended) Information"
and that he had "read it, or had it read to [him], and [that he] understood] the nature and
elements of [the] crime(s) to which [he was] pleading guilty." See R. 34. "[I]t is clear
[therefore,] that [the Information was] indeed part of the defendant's knowledge and
understanding." Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218 n.2. The Information set forth the elements of
both DUI alternatives:
COUNT 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL
AND/OR DRUGS (WITH PRIORS), in violation of §41-6-44, a third
degree felony, as follows: That on or about 8-25-2000, the defendant did
operate or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and
(i) had sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two
hours of the alleged operation or physical control showed that the defendant
had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater; or
(ii) was under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence
of alcohol and any drug to a degree which rendered the defendant incapable
of safely operating a vehicle;
and the defendant has at least two or more prior convictions under Utah
Code § 41-6-44 within six years of this violation.
9

R. 1 (Addendum B). Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the record contains a satisfactory
basis for the court's finding that defendant understood the nature and elements of the crime to
which he pled guilty, including the impairment alternative. As noted in Visser, "[s]trict
compliance does not require a specific method of communicating the rights enumerated by
rule 11." 2000 UT 88, at % 13. Where, as here, the plea affidavit expressly refers to the
elements as set forth in the Information, the trial court's reliance thereon satisfies rule 11.
See id. at f 12 (holding that strict compliance can be accomplished by reference to "the
contents of other documents such as the information")Even assuming that the affidavit only referred to the chemical test alternative of the
DUI statute, it would still satisfy the rule 11 requirement that defendant understand the nature
and elements of the offense. Section 41-6-44 is a single offense which may be proved either
by showing that the driver had a BAC of .08 grams or greater or by showing that the driver
was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely
operating a vehicle. The statute thus equates the concepts of BAC limits and alcohol
impairment "as alternative ways of establishing the actus reus of a single crime." See State
v. Bratthauer, 354 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 1984) (holding trial court not required to give
instruction requiring jury unanimity on the alternative means for committing DUI); see also
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314,1319 (Utah 1983) (holding that alcohol limit "gives rise
to a conclusive presumption of being under the influence"). Because the two alternatives are
conceptually identical, the plea affidavit adequately informed defendant of the nature and
elements of the crime to which he pled. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). In short,
10

defendant's claim that the affidavit was inadequate is unavailing because the affidavit's
reference to the legal limit "d[id] not distort the nature of [defendant's] criminal conduct or
create a false impression concerning that conduct." Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1038
(Utah 1989).2
2. A Factual Basis Exists for Defendant's Guilty Plea.
Defendant also argues that his Statement provided no factual basis for the plea. Aplt.
Brf. at 15-17. "In order to satisfy the factual basis requirement, 'the record must reveal either
facts that would support the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would suggest a
defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial.'" State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App
186,1 13, 5 P.3d 1222 (quoting State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah App. 1993));
accord Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). This requirement was satisfied here.
In his sworn statement, defendant stated:
I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute
or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for
the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of
the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):
/ was driving my car
I had been drinking
I have two prior DUI's w/i
last 6 years

2

In Hurst, the trial court permitted defendant to plead guilty to a crime he factually
did not commit—aggravated sexual abuse of a child—to avert the risk of conviction for the
crimes with which he was charged—sodomy on a child and sexual abuse of a child. 777 P.2d
at 1038. The Supreme Court upheld the guilty plea on the ground that the crime to which
defendant pled was "of the same genre of crimes" as those charged leaving noriskthat the
conviction distorted the nature of defendant's conduct.
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R. 34 (emphasized lines hand-written). Although defendant asserts that the foregoing factual
basis was inadequate, he does not explain why. In his statement, defendant admits that he
was driving his car, that he had been drinking, and that he had two prior DUI convictions
within the previous six years. The affidavit did not identify the beverage defendant had been
drinking. However, "drinking" is universally used in reference to the consumption of
alcoholic beverages. Given the term's universal meaning, as well as the context in which the
statement was given, the trial court could with confidence infer that the statement was an
admission that defendant had been drinking alcohol. Moreover, use of the phrase "I had been
drinking" implies that defendant's consumption was not limited to a single drink, but
involved multiple drinks. The factual basis provided in the affidavit, therefore, "established]
that the charged crime [of DUI] was actually committed by the defendant," or, at the very
least, that "the prosecution ha[d] sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction," Utah R. Crim, P, 1 l(e)(4XB). That is all that is required.
Moreover, the record considered to determine the factual basis for defendant's guilty
plea "consists of the entire record before [the Court] on appeal, which includes all portions of
the trial court record certified on appeal." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 674 (Utah App.
1993).

Accordingly, this Court may properly consider the transcript of defendant's

preliminary hearing. See Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 862-63 (Utah 1992) (reviewing
preliminary hearing transcript to determine whether there was factual basis for plea).
At that hearing, which was presided over by the same judge who took defendant's
plea, the evidence demonstrated that defendant and a friend purchased a case of beer at a gas
12

station and returned some two hours later to purchase more. R. 106:4,8. Defendant drove
into the gas station "jerking and lurching, and stomping on the brake." R. 106:4. He almost
fell over backwards when he exited the driver's seat and he staggered into the station after
filling his truck with gas. R. 106: 5-6, 13-14. Defendant was very boisterous and his eyes
were glazed over, his speech was "very slurred," and a "strong" odor of alcohol emanated
from his person. R. 106: 5-6,14,18. The station manager assessed that defendant was "way
past anything reasonable" in terms of his faculties and the sheriff agreed, concluding that he
was "very intoxicated." R. 106: 5, 8, 14, 17-18. Moreover, when defendant was asked to
submit to a breath test, he refused. R. 106: 19, 22. These facts provided more than a
sufficient basis for the plea.
* * *

In summary, the record demonstrates that defendant understood the nature and
elements of the crime to which he pled guilty. The record also demonstrates that a factual
basis existed for the guilty plea. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that "defendant
[was] aware of his legal and constitutionalrightsand that he [had] knowingly and voluntarily
waived those rights." R. 108: 7.
B,

THE PROSECUTOR FULFILLED THE TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT.

Defendant also challenges the trial court's ruling that the prosecutor's report to the
Board of Pardons did not constitute a breach of the plea agreement. Aplt. Brf. at 17-24. In
its ruling, the trial court determined that the plea agreement concerned "the prosecutor's
recommendation to the court on what the sentence would be, not recommendations, if any, to
13

the board of pardons on the length of a prison sentence." R. 100-01 (Addendum C).
Defendant's challenge to the ruling fails.
1. The Plea Agreement, the Sentencing Recommendation, and the Report
to the Board of Pardons.
Plea Agreement. At the plea hearing, counsel for defendant informed the court that in
exchange for defendant's plea, the State "agreed to recommend that [defendant] only serve
90 days in the [ ] San Juan County Jail," to be served concurrently with a jail sentence he was
presently serving in Blanding. R. 108:4-5. After accepting the guilty plea, the court asked
the prosecutor if he wanted the matter referred to Adult Probation & Parole (AP & P) for a
presentence investigation report (PSI). R. 108:7. The prosecutor responded in the negative,
indicating that his "recommendation is going to be the same." R. 108: 7. The court
nevertheless ordered preparation of a PSI and set a sentencing date. R. 108: 7, 9.
Presentence Investigation Report. The PSI recommended that defendant be sentenced
to prison for an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years. PSI at 13-14. The recommendation
was based on defendant's extensive criminal history, which revealed eight DUI convictions
and four assault convictions of varying degrees, and AP & Fs assessment that defendant
would not be a good candidate for rehabilitation while on probation. See PSI at 4-7.
Sentencing. At sentencing, defense counsel asked the court to deviate from the
recommendation of AP & P and "follow the recommendation of the state for ninety days
[with] credit [for] the time served; and that he be allowed to finish his parole from New
Mexico and be placed on probation in the state of Utah." R. 107: 9. The prosecutor replied:

14

. . . [Defense counsel] is correct. The reason why we agreed to recommend the
ninety days is because he had done a year in Farmington, New Mexico after he
had gotten the DUI here, so that's the recommendation I promised to give, and
that's the recommendation I'm giving.
R. 107: 9. Thus, true to the State's plea agreement, the prosecutor made the agreed
recommendation. R. 107:9. Notwithstanding that recommendation, the trial court sentenced
defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years. R. 107: 10.
Report to Board of Pardons. After defendant's sentencing, the prosecutor submitted
his report to the Board of Pardons as required under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (1999).
R. 85-86. In that report, the prosecutor expressed his belief that defendant represented a
"severe and real risk to anyone on the highways in the state of Utah and to himself and that
defendant should serve 2Vi years of his prison term. R. 86 (Addendum D).
2. The Prosecutor Did Not Breach the Plea Agreement.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor violated the terms of the plea agreement when he
recommended to the Board of Pardons that defendant serve 2*/2 years of his prison term.
Aplt. Brf. at 21-24. A plea bargain creates a contractual relationship between the State and
the defendant, subject, of course, to constitutional restraints. State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,
387 (Utah App. 1997). Accordingly, "a prosecutor may not make promises which induce a
guilty plea and then refuse to keep those promises." State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,1275
(Utah 1988). If the prosecutor breaches the plea agreement, the remedy for the defendant "is
frequently specific performance." State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988). Under
some circumstances, a defendant may be allowed to withdraw his plea if the prosecutor
breached the plea agreement. See State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, f 9, 57 P.3d 238.
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Defendant argues that the prosecutor's report to the Board of Pardons was a breach of
his agreement to make a sentencing recommendation of 90 days in jail to be served
concurrently with his Blanding sentence. Aplt. Brf. at 23. In interpreting a contractual
agreement, this Court "first lookjs] to the four corners of the agreement to determine the
intent of the parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. BlomquisU 112> P.2d 1382,
1385 (Utah 1989). Review of the plea agreement demonstrates that the promise of the
prosecution was limited to a sentencing recommendation to the trial court. As expressed by
the parties at the change of plea hearing, in the sworn statement of defendant, and at the
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor agreed to recommend that defendant serve 90 days in the
San Juan County Jail, that it be served concurrently with the sentence he was presently
serving in Blanding, and that defendant be placed on probation in Utah. R. 37; R. 107:7-9;
R. 108:4-6. These are all matters to be determined by the trial court at sentencing. See Utah
R. Crim. P. 22(c) (providing that "[u]pon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall impose sentence"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (1999) (providing that a court
may sentence a person to pay a fine, to probation, to imprisonment, etc.); Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-401(1) (providing that "court shall determine . . . whether to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (8)(v) (1999) (providing that court may
require defendant to serve up to one year in jail as a condition of probation). The record
establishes that the prosecutor made the agreed recommendation at the sentencing hearing,
see R. 107: 9, and defendant has not argued otherwise on appeal. Aplt. Brf. at 21-24.
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Defendant contends, however, that the Board of Pardons is the "ultimate sentencing
authority" and that the prosecutor's recommendation to the Board thus constituted a
"sentencing recommendation" contrary to the terms of the plea agreement. Aplt. Brf. at 2324. The Board, however, does not impose sentence, but determines the date of a defendant's
release after the sentence has been imposed. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-7 (1999); see also
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985). Although the Board's power to
determine the actual time a defendant will serve is "a power analogous to that of a court to
actually impose a sentence," Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994), it
nevertheless falls short of actual sentencing authority to decide whether probation will be
granted, whether prison will be imposed, or whether the term will be served concurrently or
consecutively with other sentences.
In this case, defendant decided to plead guilty after securing the prosecutor's promise
to recommend that the court sentence him to a 90-day jail term as a condition of probation, to
be served concurrently with a sentence he was presently serving in Blanding. See R. 37;
R. 107: 7-9; R. 108: 4-6. In other words, the inducement to plead guilty was a favorable
sentencing recommendation from the prosecutor in the hope that the court would impose
probation rather than prison. Defendant nevertheless understood that probation was subject
to the will of the court. After the terms of the plea agreement were explained to the court and
before the plea was accepted, the court expressly advised defendant that it did "not have to
follow any sentencing recommendation the prosecutor may have agreed to make and [could]
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impose the maximum sentence of up to five years in prison." R. 108: 6. Defendant
confirmed that he understood and pled guilty. R. 108: 6-7.
As promised, the prosecutor made the favorable recommendation at sentencing. See
R. 107: 9. At that point, the inducement or consideration for the guilty plea had been
fulfilled—a favorable sentencing recommendationfromthe prosecutor. Defendant was then
left to hope that the court would deviatefromthe PSI report and instead follow the favorable
recommendation of the prosecutor. In short, defendant received the benefit of the bargain.
The bargain having been fulfilled, the prosecutor's actions after sentencing could not
constitute a breach of the agreement. "Where a defendant is aware there is no guarantee the
court will agree to follow the recommendation of the prosecutor," as was the case here,
"there is no reason to set aside a plea of guilty." State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129,131 (Utah
1976).3
As noted by defendant, the prosecutor's report to the Board of Pardons is mandated by
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (1999). And although section 77-27-13 does not specifically
ask for a recommendationfromthe prosecutor as part of that report, neither does it forbid it.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5). Indeed, the statute's provision that the report include
"any other information the prosecutor believes will be relevant to the board" fairly

3

Moreover, had the prosecutor promised to make a similar recommendation to the
Board of Pardons, that promise would have been illusory since the Board was powerless to
order that the time be served in jail, that it be served concurrently with another sentence, or
that defendant be placed on probation. See Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1275 (holding that a
promise to make a recommendation which court cannot follow is illusory and misleading).
18

contemplates the inclusion of a prosecutor's belief regarding the appropriate term of actual
incarceration given the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation and his risk to society.
Defendant does correctly point out that the report to the Board of Pardons must
include "a written record of any plea bargain entered into." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5)
(1999). Although the report indicated that defendant had pled guilty to the third degree
felony DUI charge in exchange for dismissal of the remaining two charges, it did not advise
the Board of the prosecutor's promise to make a sentencing recommendation. See R. 85.
The record does not show whether the Board was in fact made aware, through other sources,
of that element of the plea bargain. If it was not, this Court may remand the case for the
limited purpose of having the prosecutor submit an amended report to the Board of Pardons
more folly explaining the plea agreement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction, and if appropriate, remand the case for the limited purpose of
requiring the prosecutor to file an amended report with the Board of Pardons more folly
explaining the terms of the plea agreement.
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Addendum \
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.
<f/XvW

l£*-f/

Defendant
, hereby acknowledge and certify that i have been.
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
I.

fr^vW

lf*f/

Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (orsegBBst) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision
On t J

;A/(S-

u*/-v$*a

Degree
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Punishment
Miu/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
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^ - ?

D.

i
8/27/OL

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or aiafetest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
flttW hH^iui
V
N\L

<W>u/ (4 4
Uti^
vf .eft
01
b+vWL-

t~/

Zdn,

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above^Qr.Jf I am pladiaruu cuutest. I am norcontesting that I committed the
fofegoing~aintte). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(oi ue etatest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(o.mufiflfltest):
<0&*/V<£.(A>

Liy/\

\j>

M \*p*t.

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand
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that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
I (have not) (fisv€) waived myrightto counsel. If I have waived myrightto counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived myrightto counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived myrightto counsel, my attorney is n ' l '^H s ^
ik
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have arightto a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up thatrightby pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, a) I would have therightto see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself.
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my
refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty,
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving
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each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have therightto appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that By pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution mat may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me, If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.
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Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:
Sr^TT

it/iii

/lsss->~\^*«0

.

9, J. c*^ Uj
Cij^r)^^^o

/J/K^?

A), si

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my ownfreewill and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
1 have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I amfreeto
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
years of age. I have attended school through the
grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my .plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am do.ng
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)v I
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been
sentenced and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days
for any reason.
Dated this / bndav of

Ly/,

.20^.

"t

^EFENDANT
Subscribed and sworn to before me this nU

"

'

day of , Yltl^jgjfU

ludge
fotary Public
Residing at
My commission expires

Certificate of Defense Attorney
.the
I certify that I am the attorney for
defendant above, and that I know he/she/ has read the statement or that I have read it to
him/her, I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my
knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crimes(s)
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and
these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

4/ 7
ATTORNEY FpR DEFENDANT

Bar No.
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^O^.r,

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
_, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the
Court There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest
^ .

^^H/^K
PkOSECUTtNGATTOIWEY
Bar No.
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this l 2 $ u day of

l/ilnM^f,

, l&Zr

CT COURT JUDGE
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Craig C. Halls #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P.O. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone:(435) 587-2128 ext. 118
Fax:(435)587-3119

FILED
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

INFORMATION
CASE NO. 6057^

vs.
Judge Lyle R. Anderson
EDWIN BURTHAND LEHI
BOX 1075
BLANDJMx,UT84511
DOB:-08/35/2000 ioftl^

OTN#:

Defendant.
This information is based on evidence obtainedfromthe following witness: MIKE LACY AND
ALAN FREESTONE
The undersigned Craig Halls, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant, in San Juan County, State of Utah, committed the crime(s) of:
COUNT 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS (WITH
PRIORS), in violation of §41-6-44, a third degree felony, as follows: That on or about 8-25-2000,
the defendant did operate or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and
(i) had sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two hours of the alleged
operation or physical control showed that the defendant had a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater, or
(ii) was under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree which rendered the defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle;
and the defendant has at least two or more prior convictions under Utah Code § 41-6-44 within
six years of this violation.
COUNT 2: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED OPERATORS LICENSE, in
violation of §53-3-227(3)(a), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about 8-25-2000, the
defendant did operate a motor vehicle while his/her operator's license was denied, suspended,
disqualified, or revoked for (ii) violating Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44;

COUNT 3: NO REGISTRATION, in violation of §41-1 a-1303(1), a class C misdemeanor, as
follows: That on or about 8-25-2000, the defendant did drive or move upon any highway a
vehicle of a type required to be registered in this state
(a) that is not registered or for which a certificate of title has not been issued or applied for; or
(b) for which the required fee has not been paid..
Authorized 25 August 2000
for presentment and filing:

Craig C. Halls
San Juan County"Attorney

Addendum C

Addendum C

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County
FILEl

>

JUL 1 8 2002

In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County
State Of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 0017-85

EDWIN BURTHAND LEHI,
Defendant.

Defendant, for the third time, has moved the court to permit
him to withdraw his guilty plea.

This time he adds a claim that

the prosecutor violated the plea agreement by recommending after
sentencing, that his incarceration be for at least two years and a
half.
The court does not agree that an agreement to recommend a
particular sentence binds the prosecutor not to comment to the
board of pardons after sentence is imposed.

The agreement deals

with the prosecutor's recommendation to the court on what the
sentence would be, not recommendations, if any, to the board of
pardons on the length of a prison sentence.
Though this case does not require this court to reach the
question, this court disagrees that a defendant should always be
permitted to withdraw a guilty plea if the prosecutor fails to
follow through on every aspect of a plea bargain. Sometimes the

plea bargain does not foresee every eventuality and does not
expressly provide what the prosecutor may and may not do.

In that

circumstance, it seems unfair to impose such a drastic remedy if
the prosecutor guesses wrong, especially

since the prosecutor has

no right to undo a plea bargain if the defendant fails to comply.1
DATED this M/L\ day of July, 2002.

1

Consider, for example, a nvurderer who pleads to simple
murder instead of aggravated murder on the condition that he
reveal all of his criminal conduct, including forgeries of
historic writings. If he fails to reveal the truth, he still
cannot be prosecuted for aggravated murder.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

f C>

day of July, 2002,

I

mailed/hand delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing
RULING to the following:
Craig Halls
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 850
Monticello, UT 84535
Happy Morgan
Attorney at Law
8 South 100 East
Moab, UT 84532

%$fcu^
Deputy Clark
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Addendum D

CRAIG C. BALLS

San Jama County Attorney
p. 0. Box 850
Montieallo, Utah 84535
Phone 435-587-2128
Fax No. 435-587-3119
HI TBS SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
IH AHD TOR SAN JUAM COUNTY, STATE 07 UTAH
STATS 07 UTAH

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

PROSSCUfOR'S
REPORT TO
BOARD 07 PARDONS

BDNXH BURTHAND LBBT,

*

Criminal Be. 0017-85

Defendant(e).

*

in accordance- with Section 77-27-13 (5), the following
information is respectfully submitted to the Board of Pardonst
DBSCRI7TX0H 07 TBS CRIXi
Mr. Lehi was originally charged on a 3 count Information.
Count 1: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, a Third
Degree Felony based upon his prior history. Count 2* Driving on a
Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor,
count 3: Ho Registration, a Class C Misdemeanor.
PLHA BARGAINING
Defendant pled to Count 1.

Counts 2 and 3 were dismissed.

MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMBTAHCSS
This office feels that they are all aggravating circumstances
in this case. The aggravating circumstances involved in this case
include the severity of the previous criminal history and that can
be observed'..in the Pre-Sentence investigative Report which
indicate* four mad a bmlt page* of alcohol and violen&behavior.
By. thai nature.of his prior incarceration history, Mr&Lehi is
currently on parole from the state of New Mexico % having'spent 1.
year in. jail in Hew Mexico for a DUI that oecuzxedrbetwetfn the time
that this DUX occurred and the time that ha vae^senteneed for this
DUIv'. Mr 4 Lehi spent lyear in the Hew >l*xico~ pri«on before he
could-J* iibrought?- back*; to the state of*m*an«£for-purpbaa.<,ofsentencing;on? this conviction.
Mr:1-Lehi4 has a severe, alcohol problem and the*,recommendation

in this Prosecutor's Report is based somewhat on the protection of
the community froa Mr. Lehi
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS
The original DUX report and the Pre-sentencing Investigative
Report are included in this packet•
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
There are no victims or restitution involved in this DUX.
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION
Because of the defendants extensive prior record, it is my
belief that Mr. Lehi will not be rehabilitated in an in-patient
alcohol program or in counseling* I believe that he is a severe
and real risk to anyone on the highways in the state of Utah and to
himself # I believe that- he should be incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison for a significant amount of time and on these charges I
believe ought to be for 2 1/2 years•
DATED this 5th day of February, 2002.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Report to the Board of
Pardons to: The State of Utah, Board of Pardons, at 448 Bast 6400
South, Suite 300, Mnrray,Utah 84107 this 5th day of February 2002,
by placing sane postage prepaid in the Mo^ceUtTYbst Office.

s~~tt%±m Robinson

